Communalism and Hierarchy:
The Aymara Socio-Political Paradox
Shane Scaggs
Boise State University
Abstract
This paper is intended to outline the theoretical characteristics of Aymara social and political organization, provide historical information on these institutions, and present relevant hypotheses about the development and purpose of them. Significant explanation of the fiesta system is also provided to described the most observable connection between Aymara communalism and hierarchy in the social and political sphere. Discussion of hypotheses is done to explain this juxtaposition. These hypotheses include a patrilocal model, a house society model, and a study detailing “helpers at the nest” and the effect they have on reproductive success. The discussion of these hypotheses also includes recognition to their short comings and areas where further evidence is needed, such as study of Aymara and Andean prehistory and ethno-archaeological evidence for patrilineal groups in the area.
Keywords: communalism, hierarchy, altiplano, fictive kinship, exchange
The Aymara people of the Andean altiplano can be characterized by a historical juxtaposition between communalism and hierarchy within their socio-political organization. This contradictory form of organization and stratification can be attributed to a number of historical mechanisms that have made the fictive extension of kinship ties and hierarchical stratification prevalent, though this history has been obscured by contemporary research as a ritual or socioeconomic agenda (Pape, 2009). The complexities between Aymara social and political organization can be viewed as tradeoffs between a necessity for cooperation to increase survival rates, and eventual reproductive success, in conjunction with periods of acculturation to inquisition and exploitation (Tschopik, Jr, 1963). The context of the current Aymara social organization is an amalgamation of ritual and political influences from Inca, Spanish, and Hacienda lifestyle constraints (Pape, 2009).
This paper is an attempt to outline the theoretical information regarding historical Aymara social organization from peasant level of hierarchy to upper tiers of socio-political status. It will address the connection between the extension of fictive kinship and communalism. It will also present hypotheses and models posited by Anthropologists and assess and discuss the applicability of them to communalism and hierarchy in the Aymara from a theoretical and historical perspective.
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL OUTLINE
The hierarchy of Aymara sociopolitical organization is characterized by a correspondence between the group level of the hierarchy and the authority connected with it. The lower levels are grouped based on settlement structure and spatial distribution while the upper levels of the hierarchy by political connection to urban townships and political centrality within the village setting (Pape, 2009). These groupings can also be looked at as a progression of complexity and affiliation within the entire community and state, meaning that as you step up each rung of the hierarchical ladder, the responsibilities and connections within that group and its corresponding authority become more intricate and often more politically, rather than socially, bound. These leadership positions are not formally bound by election or appointment, but rather assumed by the eldest and most prestigious members of the ayllu or in the household (Hewett, 1939).
The Aymara that have not migrated to urbanized townships, like La Paz in Bolivia, reside in rural villages known as Communidades (Buechler, 1971). These villages are typically separated into a number of zones, called ayllus, and it has been posited that historically these zones were based on family groups (Astvaldsson, 1996; Tschopik, Jr, 1963). Rural Aymara villages that have a closer proximity to larger townships of political significance, such as La Paz, often divide their ayllu groups into upper and lower moieties (Tschopik, Jr, 1963). The status of these moieties and the aylllus that make of them are elevated based on which headman in the community was connected to the political center (Astvaldsson, 1996; Pape, 2009; Tschopik, Jr, 1963). This system of governance is often compared to the Pueblo clan system and bears resemblence to (Hewett, 1939). The extended wet and dry seasons of the year in the Altiplano also have been said to bear resemblance to “summer people” and “winter people,” a prevalent division in the southern Pueblo (Hewett, 1939).
Ideal-type Village Hierarchy
Beginning with the bottom of an ideal-type hierarchy is the typical peasant household and its respective headman that make up the estancia (Buechler, 1971). These households are made up of the father, his extended family, and any fictive kin that feel at home in the household and have rights to the land. As the Aymara are most commonly a patrilineal and patrilocal society (Tschopik, Jr, 1963), the headman, known as the alcalde, is typically the father or, with regard to the Aymara practice of primogeniture inheritance, the eldest son residing in the household (Buechler, 1971). Deviations from this practice occur when a woman marries a man whose extended family is deceased or located elsewhere, in which case she might remain in her father’s residence until they may build their own home (Buechler, 1971; Tschopik, Jr, 1963).
The second level of hierarchy is made up of the household compound or the cabildos (Pape, 2009). Within these compounds are the children of the patriline that have left the patrilocal household and built their own settlement structure. These compounds are most commonly still part of the same extended family but on occasion, a marital alliance may bring in affinal kin to the land or residence of the patriline, as was mentioned in the previous paragraph (Tschopik, Jr, 1963). Since most of these types of compounds still subsist on the same plot of land, it seems that this is not necessarily a new level of the hierarchy, but rather an extension of the first. However, if the size of the compound reaches to large a stature, a new representative authority is selected for this group - the jilanqu (Astvaldsson, 1996; Pape, 2009). These bottom two levels of hierarchy are directly related to the settlement structure and spatial organization. There are also some situations in which a headman is representative, known as the pi’qi, of a set of compounds and this authority will rotate amongst them (Astvaldsson, 1996).
The third level of an ideal-type, Aymara hierarchy consists of two moieties that are composed of all the cabildos or “minor ayllus” within the village. These two moieties are considered to be upper and lower halves of the entire communidad (Tschopik, 1963). Each moiety has a headman known as the jilakata for the upper, and the kuraka for the lower and according to I.S.R. Pape (2009), these dual polities are found in many Andean indigenous communities and are not considered as solely an Aymara institution. These moieties are prevalent in townships that are more urban and are usually absent in the rural villages (Tschopik, Jr, 1963).
The fourth level of hierarchy is based solely upon the residence of the Segunda Mayor. This individual is often a man, and he is the political connection to urban townships and holds jurisdiction over the entire village (Pape, 2009). The Segunda Mayor is also the basis for which moieties are considered to be upper or lower. The ayllus that make up the upper moiety are the ones that are in the closest proximity to the ayllu where the Segunda Mayor resides (Astvaldsson, 1996; Pape, 2009). This is likely because of the central political connection that the Segunda Mayor holds to larger governing bodies of the state or country.
This system of sequential leadership can be likened to a judicial system in the united states. Each headman is responsible for consolidated arguments and disputes within his level of the hierarchy unless it cannot be solved, in which case it is passed on to the next level of authority, much like local, district, and federal courts (Buechler, 1971).
The Familial Household
Four orders of kinship. According to Harry Tschopik, Jr, a typical Aymara household consists of “a man and his brothers, their wives, sons, and unmarried daughters” (1963). There are also fictive kin that often live within the household and because of this there are four orders of kin identified in Aymara society, according to Hans and Judith-Maria Buechler: people that are living in and feel completely at home in the household, maintained relatives, distant relatives, and aini relatives (1971). The first two categories include the eldest male of the household and his extended family, as mentioned before, but also include those with which that man may have extended usufruct land rights or some other situation involving reciprocal servitude. The third order, termed as the “maintained relatives” by Hans and Judith-Maria Buechler (1971), are usually the daughters that have moved into their husband’s households. The fourth order of kin, known as the aini kin, are ritual kinship bods that are formed during fiestas and potlatch ceremonies. These kin are members of the community, whether biological or unrelated, that have contributed goods, resources, or service to the household that is sponsoring the fiesta, and that will later be expecting reciprocation when sponsoring their own fiestas (Buechler, 1971; Tschopik, Jr, 1963).
Inheritance and land ownership. Families within one household subsist off of one particular plot of land that has likely been in the family for several generations, however, this land inheritance and tenure decreases in prevalence after the Agrarian Reform, during which time land that was owned by the Haciendas was taken and redistributed amongst the peasant population (Buechler, 1971). It is now more prevalent for land to be communal and annually redistributed to young men that have moved out of their father’s household and built a house of their own (Tschopik, Jr, 1963). Family names are uncommon amongst the Aymara, but when they are used the family takes on the name of the oldest paternal ancestor, the tunu, that is associated with the location of the land (Tschopik, Jr, 1963). Sometimes these tunu are remembered or mythical ancestors and in this way, these familial groups have more clan genealogy than biological relations (Astvaldsson, 1996). These tunu relatives are usually only brought up during proscripted marriages or land disputes (Tschopik, Jr, 1963).
Historically, primogeniture was the prevalent mechanism for land and property inheritance among the Aymara but with the advent of Republican Laws in modern time, inheritance has become more partible to both male and female children in addition to allowing women the right to own land (Tschopik, Jr, 1963).
Marriage and reciprocal servitude. Marriage in Aymara communities has never had any formal prescription but tends to be endogamous to the ayllu level (Tschopik, Jr, 1963). After marriage, a woman is obligated to serve her husband as her first priority and her natal family second. A woman’s service to her husband’s father can also alleviate ritual debts that her husband may owe, such that a day of work for her father-in-law removes a day of work her husband owes (Buechler, 1971; Tschopik, Jr, 1963). This form of reciprocation is typically only necessary because of the fiesta system and the aini relatives associated with it. These debts refer to the aini gifts the husband and his family receive during a marriage ritual and corresponding fiesta (Buechler, 1971; Tschopik, Jr, 1963). Exogamous marriages are sometimes proscribed between ayllus for alliances, specifically to gain access to resources and pasture land in the cordillera but this usually not usually reciprocal endeavor, meaning that wives are not exchanged in both directions (Buechler, 1971; Chapais, 2008; Tschopik, Jr, 1963).
The Fiesta System
The fiesta system utilized by the Aymara is a system of potlatch involving “total prestations” as defined by Marcel Mauss in his book, The Gift (1967). A system of prestations and counterprestations links all adult members of the communidad and is the only direct connection between social organization and political organization (Buechler, 1971). Although these prestations are not intended to be formal contracts of exchange, they are socially obligatory and are carried out amongst groups but maintained by individuals (Buechler, 1971; Mauss, 1967). Typical prestations in an Aymara community are exchange items like beer, money, bread, fruit, lamb, and other foodstuffs (Buechler, 1971). A fiesta sponsor is responsible for keeping track of all prestations of high value or of ritual significance (Buechler, 1971) so that proper counterprestations can be made accordingly. The feasts involved in the fiesta system have a hierarchical ranking of importance, the most significant feasts being those associated with Catholic holidays, and a fiesta sponsor is only obligated to reciprocate prestations at a fiesta that is of equal or greater significance to the fiesta he sponsored in order to receive these gifts (Buechler, 1971).
The significance of fiestas in Aymara communities lies in their connection to political and social status. Prestige in the community is based on fiesta sponsorship and by proxy, wealth. A wealthy man can sponsor important fiestas to gain prestige in the community. Through this sponsorship, he can also gain consideration for political standing or even public office (Buechler, 1971). Headman and authority positions do not require wealth or fiesta sponsorship for eligibility, but they are often the given to the most prestigious men in the community. Fiesta sponsorship is also a mechanism by which a poor man can attain higher social status. A poor, peasant man can begin by sponsor lesser fiestas and through the maintenance and reciprocation of prestations to a large network of adults in the community, he can gain a following of people that will also be reciprocating (Buechler, 1971). This is the ideal method for poorer and lower status members of the community to gain resources to throw fiestas of higher significance and thereby, gain prestige without necessarily increases annual income and wealth.
The feasts involved in these fiestas are also the only social interaction that involves the entire communidad. This means that it is the only social medium that allows individuals to bring up disputes between families and zones, express differences and rivalries, or provide intersectional competition (Buechler, 1971).
HYPOTHESES AND SKEPTICISMS
There are a number of applicable hypotheses for the conjunction of Aymara communalism and hierarchy. Environmental constraints play a huge part in shaping the social sphere and subsistence strategies used by the Aymara. Through mutual aid, reciprocal servitude, and ritual potlatch, the Aymara have developed a social organization that can better the chances of survival in such an unforgiving climate. The influence of Incan, Spanish, and colonial Hacienda politics has also superimposed a layer of aristocratic stratification that can be identified in contemporary Aymara social status.
“Patrilocal Band Model”
The social characteristics of the Aymara people fit very closely with Julian Stewards cross-cultural description of “patrilineal bands,” as discussed by Chapais in Primeval Kinship (2008). These characteristics are “patrilineality, patrilocality, exogamy, lineage composition, and land ownership” (Steward, 1955). These qualities were applied by Steward specifically to hunter-gatherer societies and because of this there may an ontogenetic use of this band model toward the Aymara, meaning that they may have developed into agriculturalists adapted to scarce resource subsistence from hunting and gathering scarce resources. The Aymara are known to be patrilineal and connected to plots of land that are often in a family name and this may be an indication band composition in prehistory. This is according to Stewards quote in Primeval Kinship, (Chapais, 2008) “...men tend to remain more or less in the territory in which they are reared...patrilineally related families would tend to band together to preoect their game resources. The territory would become divided among these patrilineal bands.” It would then become just a simple step from a nomadic lifestyle to a sedentary one, but lack of prehistoric evidence for Aymara society prevents this and thus, this hypothesis suffers on an ultimate level.
However, the “patrilocal band model,” posited by Elman Service (1962) and critiqued by Bernard Chapais (2008) in relation to Steward’s model, brings to light an explanation that fits more closely with Aymara society. This is the idea that patrilocality is less a connection to descent and lineage, but rather a product of male cooperation and developmental familiarity. Service describe two goals of this cooperation, the first being hunting success which is not directly applicable to the Aymara agricultural lifestyle, but the second is territorial defense. The Aymara are known for living in endogamous, patrilocal ayllus that are believed to be historically based on a family connection to the land. This implies that the males through these generations have been recognized with these territories and maintained ownership of them. Service’s model is challenged by Richard Lee and Irven DeVore in Man the Hunter (1968), as also discussed by Chapais (2008), saying that hunting and gathering groups are more flexible than this model suggests, often showing signs of bilateral kinship and locality. I would posit that this has to do with the nomadic nature of locality in hunting and gathering groups, and that perhaps the “patrilocal band model” can be just as suitable for a semi-sedentary or entirely sedentary population located in a harsh, agricultural environment with scare resources, like the Aymara. The scarce resources in the Andean altiplano would be comparable to those of hunter-gatherer groups in terms of overall, ecological, carrying capacity and would explain the necessity for the male cooperation that Service suggests. The prevalence of this cooperation is seen in Aymara practices of reciprocal servitude, gift-giving, and extension of fictive kinship based on mutual aid. The sedentary and territorial nature of the Aymara would also fit into the patrilocality associated with this male cooperation and implies developmental familiarity by their segmentation into patrilocal family groups.
“House Society”
Michael E. Smith and Katharina J. Schreiber discuss a number of resources associated with the research of corporate identities in their article New World State and Empires: Economics and Social Organization (2005). One Levi-Strauss (1987) model that is used particularly for analyzing the ayllu and other Meso-American by S.D. Gillespie (2000) and J.K. Chance (2000) is the “house society” model. The model describes populations whose corporate identity is connected to a “house” that can be physical or metaphorical, and is sometimes used interchangeably as a term for lineages (Smith and Schreiber, 2005). The Aymara recognize their kindred bilaterally, distinguishing only by gender and generation leading some to believe that cognatic descent was influential in the division of these ayllu zones (Astvaldsson, 1996; Tschopik, Jr, 1963). This means that ego’s father and uncles fall into the same category of kinship terminology, and his mother and aunt’s in another. The same would apply to ego’s brothers and male cousins, sisters and female cousins, and even grandmother’s and grandfathers. This method of lineage and kinship is very general on a household scale and appears to fit into a model where the overall identity of the household is connected to a common ancestor rather than to specific sets of kin or lines of descent. This would seem to fit with Levi-Strauss’ “house society” model except that in Aymara society, the system of hierarchy involving a headman on each rung of the hierarchical ladder removes corporate identity from a place of emphasis. The “house society” hinges on the idea that the group is collectively identified by their “house” as their lineage. In Aymara society, the eldest male is the identity for the house as its respective headman, following the same male representative pattern for the upper tiers of the hierarchy. In the case where the Aymara household is identified by its tunu, or oldest remembered male ancestor, this model may fit more closely but would lose continuity moving up in social stratification. Even so, this provides only a proximate explanation for Aymara communalism and lends little ultimate level insight to the origin of this social organization.
“Helpers at the Nest”
The hypothesis that “helpers at the nest” increases reproductive success is typically applied to children remaining with their natal group and is particularly applied to ecological behavior in environments with scarce resources and environmental constraints, such as the Andean altiplano (Crognier, Villena, and Vargas, 2002). This is widely accepted as a parental manipulation strategy in peasant societies and this kind of altruism is associated with innate desire to further one’s own reproductive success and gene perpetuation (Chapais, 2008; Crognier, Villena, and Vargas; 2002). Aymara children are known to be a vital part of subsistence, specifically functioning as the primary pastoralists of the household of their father (Buechler, 1971). Aymara sons also remain the residence of their father until they are able to build a house of their own, but these houses are always located in very close proximity to the family and always on the same land that is used for agricultural, making their dispersal almost irrelevant as far as changes in socioeconomic returns for the family (Buechler 1971; Crognier, Villena, and Vargas, 2002). A study done by E. Crognier, M. Villena, and E. Vargas of Aymara fertility (2002) shows that in families where only the first-born remained in a caretaking role, the birth intervals were longer but ultimately had higher numbers of live births and reproductive success was almost doubled.
The same phrase could also be applied to describe the extension of fictive kinship within a household, a practice common in Aymara communities through mutual aid. As stated by an Aymara social scientist named Mauricio Mamani in an article by Jane Collins (1983), “if we deeply understand the systems of Andean reciprocity, it is revealing that no one gives gratuitously,” meaning that in a system of exchange and mutual aid, it is likely that neither party is gaining more than the other in socioeconomic terms. However, since this extension of kinship and residence is most often extended by one man’s household to an individual outside that social group, the aid given by the outsider may be helping to increase the reproductive success of the household. This is because the typical exchange consists of a man extending residence, and therefore kinship, to an outside individual in return for labor (Buechler, 1971). The outside individual is likely not reproducing and because of this, the household within which they reside is gaining reproductive benefits from the subsistence labor and caretaking they provide. This mechanism of exchange is the same when utilized between fathers and uncles and their sons (Tschopik, Jr, 1963), except that both gain reproductive benefits. This hypothesis suffers because it is difficult to discern it as a proximate or ultimate level mechanism due to a lack of pre-historical evidence and historical evidence prior to Incan inquisition.
However, Jane Collins posits (1983) that the ritual kinship ties in Aymara families are an institutionalized construct derived from a southern European form of co-parenthood, and this institution may have carried over from the ritual kin to fictive, subsistence based kin in Aymara communities. This explanation shows a obvious proximate mechanism for furthering reproductive success and looking back on Aymara history, it provides an ultimate explanation for Aymara communalism.
Acculturation
The hierarchical system in Aymara communities bears resemblance to the hierarchies of the inquisitors in their history, namely the Inca and Spanish. The Aymara were often pushed to the lower tiers of social status during these inquisitions with the Inca being an aristocratic royal court to the peasants and later the Spanish as a hacienda system of land tenure (Buechler, 1971; Tschopik, Jr, 1963).
During the Hacienda or “protectorate” system, land was owned by a landlord and peasants in the community were obligated to take care of the subsistence on these lands for the landlord, and in return they received usufruct land rights that were often hardly enough to provide for an entire family (Buechler, 1971). Obligations to the landlord varied and translated to different levels of hierarchy within the peasant community, distinguished between those that fulfilled their duty to the landlord, those that fulfilled extra obligations, and those that only helped others fulfill obligation whilst not fulfilling their own (Buechler, 1971). During this time of unremunerated subsistence, it was beneficial for families to adopt kin in order to gain access to more land for personal subsistence, especially kin that would be considered part of the upper level of peasant hierarchy and would gain them more land from the landlord.
After the Agrarian Reform and the abolition of unremunerated obligations to a landlord, there were some notable changes to social structure, namely the reduction in family size and the appointing of headmen in place of oppressive landlords (Buechler, 1971). However, the practice of extending kinship and applying peasant hierarchy continued. This would point to the influence of inquisition on creating a necessity for both hierarchy and communalism. This argument, again, suffers due to lack of evidence for the pre-Incan Aymara populations that would be required to discern the continuity of this hierarchy.
DISCUSSION
It is my contention that the best explanation for the conjunction of communalism and hierarchy is a tradeoff between reducing the cost of parenting in order to increase survival rates in a harsh climate and increase reproductive benefits and the acculturation to the inquisition of the Inca and Spanish. Chapais’ discussion of maternity costs (2008) provides insight for the co-parenting seen in the communalist lives of Aymara people.
On an ultimate level, communalism can be explained as an adaptation to a harsh climate with scarce resources. Out of this scarcity is an ontogenetic development of exchange and co-parenthood for reducing parenting costs that can be especially costly when resources are few in the altiplano. For the Aymara individual, exchange and the extension of fictive kinship can act as a proximate mechanism for increasing reproductive benefits. This can be seen in day-to-day activities of reciprocal servitude among extended families as well as ritual exchanges of goods during fiestas. Phylogenetically, this communalism can be attributed to male cooperation in evolutionary history that could lead to territorial patrilineages and patrilocalities seen in the Aymara, as posited by Service (1962) and reviewed in Chapais.
It is also my contention that the hierarchical system used in Aymara communities is an institutional construct that was superimposed by the colonization and inquisition of oppressing groups. The hierarchy seen in Aymara history is a remnant of past institutions of Inca and Spanish aristocracy and through acculturation to these systems, it has survived throughout Aymara history. If you consider contemporary Aymara societies, you see that the transition from an agricultural economy to a market or “money economy,” as referred to by Ted C. Lewellen, is causing major changes to Aymara political organization and causing deviation from historical methods, specifically ritual ones like the Aymara fiesta system (2001). To me, this is an indication that institutions, whether political or symbolic, are primarily a cultural phenomenon and are not entirely, if at all, biological grounded.
CONCLUSION
The Aymara people are a population of indigenous peasants that have been historically oppressed by inquisition and acculturation. In spite of this, they have remained adaptive to one of the harshest environment on the globe and continue to subsist and maintain extended familial units on scarce resources. Their utilization of potlatch as a both a social and political tool has kept their society alive and provides significant insights about the effect exchange and mutual aid on survival and reproductive success. Further areas of research should be focused on Aymara and Andean social organization in prehistory. Although the Titicaca Basin is considered a very rich archaeological site, there has been little ethno-archaeological work done here and no significant theories can be posited until the prehistorical development of communalism and exchange this area is documented.
Appendix
Authority: Jurisdiction:
Segunda Mayor 
Communidad
Jilakata/Kuraka 
Upper Moiety Lower Moiety
Jilanqu 
Cabildos Cabildos
Alcalde 
Estancias Estancias
Figure 1. This visual representation of an ‘Ideal-Type’ hierarchy is based on the model created by I.S.R. Pape in his 2009 article, Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class. No stipulations to the number of groups possible in an Aymara ayllu other than the two moieties.
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